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Abstract
Some of the most interesting recent work in formal epistemology has focused on develop-
ing accuracy-based approaches to justifying Bayesian norms. These approaches are interesting
not only because they offer new ways to justify these norms, but because they potentially of-
fer a way to justify all of these norms by appeal to a single, attractive epistemic goal: having
accurate beliefs. Recently, Easwaran & Fitelson (2012) have raised worries regarding whether
such “all-accuracy” or “purely alethic” approaches can accommodate and justify evidential
Bayesian norms. In response, proponents of purely alethic approaches, such as Pettigrew
(2013b) and Joyce (2016), have argued that scoring rule arguments provide us with compatible
and purely alethic justifications for the traditional Bayesian norms, including evidential norms.
In this paper I raise several challenges to this claim. First, I argue that many of the justifica-
tions these scoring rule arguments provide are not compatible. Second, I raise worries for the
claim that these scoring rule arguments provide purely alethic justifications. Third, I turn to
assess the more general question of whether purely alethic justifications for evidential norms
are even possible, and argue that, without making some contentious assumptions, they are not.
Fourth, I raise some further worries for the possibility of providing purely alethic justifications
for content-sensitive evidential norms, like the Principal Principle.
1 Introduction
Some of the most interesting recent work in formal epistemology has focused on the project of
developing scoring rule arguments for Bayesian norms.1 These scoring rule arguments apply
the apparatus of decision theory to the epistemic realm, appealing to epistemic analogs of
decision theoretic principles in order to show that we should satisfy these norms.
1The term “Bayesian” is often applied to views that endorse both Probabilism (the claim that a subject’s credences
should be probabilistic) and Conditionalization (the claim that a subject’s new credences, upon receiving evidence,
should be equal to her prior credences conditional on her evidence). Here I use the term “Bayesian norm” broadly, to
include any norm that imposes a constraint on a subject’s credences or degrees of belief. Thus Probabilism and Con-
ditionalization are examples of what I’ll call “Bayesian norms”, as are norms like Lewis’s (1980) Principal Principle,
van Fraassen’s (1995) Reflection Principle, Indifference Principles, and the like.
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One reason this project is interesting is that it provides a justification for Bayesian norms
which avoids many of the problems facing older attempts, such as dutch book arguments and
representation theorem arguments. A second reason this project is interesting is that it has
been seen as providing a way of justifying Bayesian norms that’s compatible with Veritism —
the view that the only epistemic goal is to have beliefs that are as accurate as possible, and
that every epistemic norm must ultimately boil down to and be justified in terms of this goal.2
The thought is that if we can plug in some measure of accuracy into our decision theoretic
principles, and then show how it follows from this that we should satisfy various Bayesian
norms, then we’ll be able to provide a purely alethic justification for Bayesian norms — a
justification that doesn’t appeal to anything besides the goal of having accurate beliefs. And if
we can provide purely alethic justifications for all of the main Bayesian norms, then we have a
way of justifying the Bayesian framework that is congruous with Veritism.
Reconciling Bayesianism and Veritism would be a remarkable achievement. For a number
of the central Bayesian norms are evidential norms, norms whose prescriptions depend on what
one’s evidence is. And, as Easwaran & Fitelson (2012) note, Veritism seems to be in tension
with the existence of evidential norms. According to Veritism, the only thing we should care
about (epistemically speaking) is having accurate beliefs. But the existence of evidential norms
suggests that we should also care about having beliefs that line up with our evidence. And it
seems like these two desiderata can come apart: a subject can have beliefs that line up with the
evidence but are nonetheless false. So if accuracy is the only thing we should care about, then
it looks like we should give up on norms which care about other things as well, like evidential
norms.
In response to these kinds of worries, Pettigrew (2013b) and Joyce (2016) have argued that
scoring rule arguments can provide us with an array of purely alethic justifications for the main
Bayesian norms, including evidential norms. And they’ve maintained, at least implicitly, that
these justifications are compatible with one another. Indeed, Pettigrew (2013b) has argued that
not only can scoring rule arguments provide us with such justifications, existing scoring rule
arguments do provide us with such justifications. I’ll call this stance on the justificatory status
of the main Bayesian norms the “All-Accuracy Account”:
The All-Accuracy Account: There are scoring rule arguments that provide us with compati-
ble purely alethic justifications for the main Bayesian norms, including evidential norms
like the Principal Principle, the Indifference Principle, and Conditionalization.
In this paper I’ll raise several worries for the All-Accuracy Account. I’ll raise some worries
about whether the existing scoring rule arguments provide justifications for these norms that
are compatible and purely alethic. And I’ll raise some concerns regarding whether it’s even
possible to provide purely alethic justifications for evidential Bayesian norms.
Despite the critical nature of this paper, it should not be seen as an attempt to bury scoring
rule arguments. Like many others, I think that the investigation of scoring rule arguments is
one of the most important recent developments in formal epistemology, and that the work done
by Joyce, Pettigrew and others in exploring this framework is invaluable. Rather, this paper
2For a defense of this view, see Goldman (2002).
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should be understood as an attempt to get clear on what these arguments actually establish,
one which suggests an appropriately modest stance regarding these accomplishments. Or, if
one prefers, this paper can be understood as an attempt to provide a helpful “to do” list of
challenges for proponents of views like the All-Accuracy Account to address.
The rest of this paper will proceed as follows. In the second section I’ll provide some back-
ground on scoring rule arguments, and the dominance principles that these arguments employ
to derive various Bayesian norms. In the third section I’ll assess the claim that the scoring
rule arguments that have been offered for these different Bayesian norms are compatible. I’ll
argue that many of the standard scoring rule arguments rely on implausible dominance prin-
ciples, and that when these principles are fixed up, many of these arguments are no longer
compatible. In the fourth section I’ll assess the claim that the scoring rule arguments that have
been offered for these different Bayesian norms provide purely alethic justifications. I’ll argue
that the most explicit argument that’s been offered for this conclusion is unsound. In the fifth
section I’ll consider whether purely alethic justifications for evidential norms are possible. I’ll
suggest that such justifications are not possible unless one adopts contentious versions of these
norms which many would reject. In the sixth section I’ll suggest that even if one adopts a
contentious version of a norm like the Principal Principle, it’s not possible to provide a purely
alethic justification for such a norm. In the seventh section I’ll conclude by sketching some big
picture morals.
2 Background
In this section, I’ll lay out some background regarding scoring rule arguments. There are a
number of ways to develop such arguments. My presentation here will largely follow Petti-
grew’s, as he’s presented perhaps the most detailed attempt to provide a unified set of scoring
rule arguments for the Bayesian norms.3 In what follows I’ll lay out some preliminary termi-
nology, briefly discuss the epistemic utility functions these arguments employ, and sketch the
decision theoretic principles these arguments employ in order to obtain the various Bayesian
norms.
2.1 Preliminaries
Let F be the doxastic propositions of a subject; that is, the set of propositions about which a
subject has beliefs. Let W be the set of consistent truth assignments to these propositions. I’ll
call the elements of W the worlds of a subject.4 I’ll assume that F is closed under the usual
logical operations (conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc). Following Pettigrew (2013b), I’ll
assume that F and W are finite.
3See Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a), Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010b), Pettigrew (2012), Pettigrew (2013a), Pettigrew
(2013b), and Pettigrew (2014).
4These “worlds” will not, of course, be as fine-grained as possible worlds, which correspond to consistent assign-
ments of truth values to every proposition (regardless of whether anyone has beliefs about them or not).
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Let a subject’s credence function be a function cr which takes propositions as arguments,
and yields real numbers in the [0,1] interval that represent the subject’s confidence in those
propositions, with higher numbers representing greater degrees of confidence.
2.2 Epistemic Utility
Let an epistemic utility function be a function U which takes a credence function and a world as
arguments, and yields a real number representing the epistemic utility of holding that credence
function at that world.
Proponents of Veritism, such as Pettigrew (2013b) and Joyce (2016), maintain that sat-
isfactory epistemic utility functions must be “alethic”, and must assign quantities that value
accuracy and nothing else. As such, they require satisfactory epistemic utility functions to
satisfy certain constraints. For example, since they want accuracy to be an overriding factor,
they require epistemic utility functions to satisfy:5
Truth-Directedness: If for all propositions A, cr(A) ≥ cr∗(A) if A is true at w and cr(A) ≤
cr∗(A) if A is false at w, and for some A, A is true at w and cr(A) > cr∗(A), or A is false
at w and cr(A) < cr∗(A), then U(cr,w) > U(cr∗,w).
Likewise, since they want accuracy to be the only relevant factor – and thus want factors such
as the content of propositions to be irrelevant — they require epistemic utility functions to
satisfy:6
Extensionality: Let fw,w∗ : F→ F be a bijection between true and false propositions at w with
true and false propositions at w∗; i.e. if fw,w∗(A) = B, then either A is true at w and B is
true at w∗, or A is false at w and B is false at w∗. If cr and cr∗ are such that, for all A,
cr(A) = cr∗( fw,w∗(A)), then U(cr,w) = U(cr∗,w∗).
These are the two most prominent constraints on alethic utility functions. Some proponents of
Veritism have suggested that alethic utility functions should satisfy some other constraints as
well, though there is disagreement regarding what exactly these further constraints should be.
Fortunately, we needn’t hash out the details of this debate here. For there is one epistemic
utility function that is widely agreed to be adequate, namely, the epistemic utility function
associated with the Brier score.7 Let the indicator function be a function I which takes a world
w and a proposition A as arguments and yields either 0 (if A is false at w) or 1 (if A is true at







7Though see Levinstein (2012) for a reason to be wary of the Brier score.
8The Brier score itself is what you get if you remove the minus sign out front: it’s a measure of inaccuracy, such
that the higher the values it yields, the less accurate the credence function.
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For the purposes of this paper, I’ll follow Pettigrew (2013b) in assuming that this is the correct
epistemic utility function.9
2.3 Dominance Norms and Bayesian Norms
Scoring rule arguments have been offered for a number of different Bayesian norms.10 I’ll
largely focus here on the arguments offered by Pettigrew. These arguments generally appeal to
a dominance norm of some sort, and proceed by using this dominance norm and an epistemic
utility function to derive the relevant Bayesian norm.
Let’s see how these arguments go. In what follows, let F be the set of doxastic propositions
of the subject; W the worlds associated with F; cr, cr∗ and cr∗∗ credence functions defined over
F; and U the correct epistemic utility function.
One of the core Bayesian norms is Probabilism:
Probabilism: A subject’s credences should be probabilistic.
The scoring rule arguments for Probabilism employ something like Strict Dominance as a
dominance norm:
Definition: A function cr is strictly dominated by cr∗ for a subject iff, for all w ∈W, U(cr,w) <
U(cr∗,w).
Strict Dominance: If a subject is such that (i) cr is strictly dominated by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is
not strictly dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
There’s some variation in the literature regarding the exact form of the dominance norm em-
ployed in the argument for Probabilism. Some employ a slightly weaker notion of dominance,
some omit the second clause, and some employ one notion of dominance in the first clause and
a slightly different notion of dominance in the second.11 But for our purposes, these differences
won’t matter.
Another core Bayesian norm is Conditionalization:12,13
9Some, like Joyce (2016), hold that there is no unique correct epistemic utility function. Instead, there’s a small
group of “kosher” utility functions, any one of which is good enough. But proponents of such views still hold that the
utility function associated with the Brier score is one of the functions that’s good enough; and that’s sufficient for our
purposes.
10For example, see Joyce (1998), Greaves & Wallace (2006), Joyce (2009), Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a), Leitgeb
& Pettigrew (2010b), Pettigrew (2012), Easwaran (2013), Pettigrew (2013a), Pettigrew (2013b), and Pettigrew (2014).
11For example, see Joyce (2009) for instances of the first and second variations, and Pettigrew (2013b) for an
instance of the third. I present Strict Dominance in the text (as opposed to one of these variants) in order to keep the
form of the different dominance norms I discuss in this section as similar as possible.
12The formulation of Conditionalization given here is a standard one. Pettigrew (2013b) applies the label “Condi-
tionalization” to a different kind of norm — a synchronic norm regarding what plans one should make, not a diachronic
norm about what credences one should have. One might motivate moving from a diachronic norm to a synchronic
norm in various ways (e.g., see Meacham (2010), Hedden (2015), and Moss (forthcoming)). But since the synchronic
rule described in Pettigrew (2013b) diverges quite a bit from the diachronic rule Bayesians generally endorse (and the
rule discussed in other places, such as Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010a)), I’ve stuck with the standard formulation here.
13Like most formulations of Conditionalization, this formulation leaves open a number of questions regarding how
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Conditionalization: If a subject with probabilistic credences cr receives evidence E, her new
credences crE should be:
crE(A) = cr(A | E), if defined. (2)
The scoring rule arguments for Conditionalization need to employ something like what I’ll call
Credal Expected E-Dominance:14
Definition: Let the subject’s credences be cr0. Assume cr0 is probabilistic, and let cr and cr∗







Credal Expected E-Dominance: If a subject is such that the next piece of evidence she’ll
receive is E at t′, and is such that (i) cr is credal expected E-dominated by cr∗, and
(ii) cr∗ is not credal expected E-dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for that
subject to adopt cr at t′.
Some formulations of the decision-theoretic norms this argument requires obscure the di-
achronic nature of these norms, and the norm’s appeal to the subject’s evidence.15 But these
features of the norm are crucial to getting the derivation to go through. As one might ex-
pect, you can’t get diachronic results about what credences a subject should have given certain
evidence without building diachronic features and appeals to evidence into one’s decision the-
oretic norm.
In addition to Probabilism and Conditionalization, most Bayesians accept a chance-credence
principle of some kind. There is some disagreement about how to best formulate this principle,
but one popular formulation, borrowing from Lewis (1980), is:16
Principal Principle: Let chG be the chance function picked out by G. The credences of a
subject with total evidence G, crG, should be such that:
crG(A) = chG(A), if defined. (4)
exactly the norm should be understood (see Schoenfield (2016) and Meacham (2016) for discussions of some of these
issues). For example, should we understand cr as the subject’s credences after she’s received all of her evidence
except E, the most recent piece of evidence she’s received, or should we understand cr as a credence function at some
arbitrary time, and E as the cumulative evidence the subject’s received since then? That said, the ambiguities of this
formulation are largely orthogonal to the issues I’ll be raising in this paper, so I’ll put these complications aside.
14This is, roughly, a dominance-style formulation of the decision theoretic norm employed by Leitgeb & Pettigrew
(2010a) in their scoring rule argument for Conditionalization. But there are a number of other ways to formulate and
divide up the norms the argument requires; see, for example, Easwaran (2013). (There are also a number of other
interesting issues regarding these arguments that I lack the space to discuss; see Schoenfield (2016).)
15E.g., see Pettigrew (2013b) and the formulation of Maximize Subjective Expected Utility.
16This formulation follows from the conjunction of Lewis’s formulation and Conditionalization. Lewis’s initial
formulation only appeals to a subject’s initial credences, prior to the receipt of evidence.
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Pettigrew’s (2013a) scoring rule argument for the Principal Principle employs what I’ll call
Chancy Expected Dominance:
Definition: Let C be the set of possible chance functions. Let E be the total evidence of the
subject. A function cr is chancy expected dominated by cr∗ for that subject iff, for all
ch ∈C: ∑
w∈W
ch(w | E) ·U(cr,w) <
∑
w∈W
ch(w | E) ·U(cr∗,w). (5)
Chancy Expected Dominance: If a subject is such that (i) cr is chancy expected dominated
by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is not chancy expected dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible
for that subject to adopt cr.
It’s worth noting that Chancy Expected Dominance’s appeal to the subject’s evidence is crucial
to the success of the argument. After all, we want the permissible credences regarding chance
events to vary depending on what a subject’s evidence is. (E.g., if a subject has no evidence
other than that the chance of heads is 1/2, their credence in heads should be 1/2. But if the
subject has no evidence other than that (i) the chance of heads is 1/2 and (ii) the coin landed
heads, their credence in heads should be 1.) And one can’t derive a norm whose prescriptions
are evidence-dependent, like the Principal Principle, without employing a decision theoretic
norm that appeals to evidence.17
Finally, some Bayesians endorse a fourth norm, an Indifference Principle of some kind.
There are a number of different kinds of Indifference Principles, but one popular version of
this principle, considered by Pettigrew (2014), is:18
Indifference Principle: The credences of a subject with total evidence E, crE , should be such
that:
∀wi,w j ∈ E, crE(wi) = crE(w j). (6)
Pettigrew’s (2014) scoring rule argument for this Indifference Principle employs Worst-Case
Dominance:
Definition: Let E be the total evidence of a subject. A function cr is worst-case dominated by
cr∗ for that subject iff there is some w ∈ E such that, for all w∗ ∈ E, U(cr,w) < U(cr∗,w∗).
Worst-Case Dominance: If a subject is such that (i) cr is worst-case dominated by cr∗, and
(ii) cr∗ is not worst-case dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for that subject
to adopt cr.
17At first glance the version of the dominance norm used to derive the Principal Principle given in Pettigrew (2013b)
doesn’t seem to make any claims about evidence. But it needs to be understood as implicitly making claims of this
kind (as the version presented in Pettigrew (2013a) does) in order for the argument to go through.
18This is the principle that Pettigrew (2014) calls “PoI+”, but the same general points apply with respect to what
Pettigrew calls “PoI”. In both cases, the principle’s prescriptions are sensitive to what the subject’s evidence is (in
the latter case, requiring the subject to not have any evidence), and in both cases the derivation of the principle won’t
follow unless we employ a norm in which the subject’s evidence plays a role.
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Again, some presentations of the scoring rule argument for the Indifference Principle employ
formulations of these decision-theoretic norms that obscure their appeal to the subject’s total
evidence.19 But these appeals to the subject’s total evidence are a vital part of these norms.
For without such appeals, the derivation of the Indifference Principle won’t go through.
3 Compatibility
Proponents of the All-Accuracy Account maintain that scoring rule arguments provide us with
compatible and purely alethic justifications for the main Bayesian norms. One worry for this
claim, which we’ll focus on in this section, has to do with whether the scoring rule arguments
for these different norms are compatible.
Pettigrew is the most prolific producer of scoring rule arguments for Bayesian norms, as
well as one of the most careful, so I’ll focus on his arguments here. The scoring rule arguments
for Bayesian norms generally take the following form: first they argue that we should adopt
a certain kind of epistemic utility function, then they argue that we should adopt a certain
decision-theoretic norm, and then they show how to use this utility function and decision-
theoretic norm to derive the relevant Bayesian norm. As we saw in section 2.3, the decision-
theoretic principles Pettigrew employs are generally dominance principles of the following
form:20
X-Dominance: If a subject is such that (i) cr is X-dominated by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is not X-
dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
By plugging in different notions of dominance into this schema, we get different decision-
theoretic principles. And we can use these different principles to derive the different Bayesian
norms.
I’ll argue that this method of deriving Bayesian norms is problematic. First, I’ll suggest that
these kinds of dominance principles are only plausible in isolation. When considered jointly,
these principles become implausible. Second, I’ll note that even though we can get around this
worry by modifying the dominance principles these derivations employ, doing so requires us
to reassess these derivations. In particular, I’ll show that once we’ve chosen which forms of
dominance we want to be epistemically relevant, we can formulate principles tracking these
notions of dominance that are jointly plausible. But once we adopt these modified principles,
we need to reassess these derivations of Bayesian norms. For in many cases these derivations
will no longer be compatible.
To get a feel for how this problem arises, let’s start by considering why Pettigrew formu-
lates these dominance principles using the above schema. It’s clear why the schema includes
19E.g., the version of the dominance norm used to derive the Indifference Principle given in Pettigrew (2013b)
doesn’t seem to make any claims about evidence. But it needs to be understood as implicitly making claims of this
kind (as the version endorsed in Pettigrew (2014) does — see sections 4 and 6 for the key caveats and revisions) in
order for the argument to go through.
20Though the form is a bit different in the case of diachronic dominance principles (such as Credal Expected
E-Dominance).
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the first clause — the thought that there’s something prima facie wrong with dominated op-
tions is a key part of the intuition underwriting these dominance norms. But why does this
schema include the second clause? At first glance, anyway, it’s tempting to simply drop the
second clause and adopt a schema like this:
X-Dominance (v0): If a subject is such that cr is X-dominated by cr∗, then it is impermissible
for that subject to adopt cr.
Pettigrew’s (2013b) reason for rejecting the Dominance (v0) schema is that it leads to ab-
surd results in cases in which there are no undominated credences. If every credence function
is dominated by another credence function, then Dominance (v0) will entail that every cre-
dence function is impermissible. If we take epistemic dilemmas — situations in which every
epistemic option is impermissible — to be impossible, then this is a reductio of Dominance
(v0).21
One way to avoid this problem is to modify the Dominance (v0) schema so that being
dominated only rules out a credence function if there are undominated credence functions to
be had. This yields the following schema:
X-Dominance (v1): If a subject is such that (i) cr is X-dominated by cr∗, and (ii) there are
undominated credence functions, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
But, as Pettigrew (2013b) notes, this revised schema is still problematic. For both Dominance
(v0) and (v1) yield the wrong results in certain cases. Here is a slight variant of a case Pettigrew
(2013b) considers. Suppose a subject can adopt any one of a countably infinite sequence of
credence functions defined over two worlds, w1 and w2. And suppose the epistemic utilities of
adopting each of these credence functions at each world are given by the following table:
cr0 cr1 cr2 ... crn ...
w1 2 1 2 ... n ...
w2 2 2− 12 2− 14 ... 2− 12n ...
Given a dominance relation that tracks these epistemic utilities, cr0 will be the only un-
dominated credence function. The function cr0 will not be dominated, since it yields a higher
21This is a bit quick, for one can avoid a reductio by rejecting any of the premises that led to the contradiction,
and there are other premises one could reject other than Dominance (v0). In particular, one could reject the premise
that there are any normatively relevant notions of dominance such that there will be no undominated options in some
cases. But this is an unattractive option: since these schemas are supposed to spell out the general relationship
between normatively relevant notions of dominance and what we ought to believe, one would like to avoid having to
make substantive assumptions about what dominance relations can hold.
In a similar fashion, one can respond to the counterexample to Dominance (v0) and Dominance (v1) given below by
maintaining that there aren’t any normatively relevant notions of dominance that will yield to the pattern of dominance
relations the case describes. But again this is an unattractive option, given that these schemas are supposed to spell out
the general relationship between normatively relevant notions of dominance and what we ought to believe.
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epistemic utility at w2 than any other credence function. But for every i > 0, cri will be domi-
nated by cri+1. And since i is unbounded, it follows that every cri>0 will be dominated.
Given Dominance (v0) or (v1), it follows that cr0 will be the only permissible credence
function. But this doesn’t seem right. For example, every probability function that assigns a
non-zero value to w1 will assign some cri>0 a higher expected utility than cr0. Thus it seems
like at least some cri>0’s should be permissible.
The moral, Pettgrew notes, is that being dominated isn’t in itself a bad thing. Whether
being dominated is a bad thing depends on the status of what’s doing the dominating. If an
option is dominated by something which has a mark against it, then this doesn’t suffice to
rule out the dominated option. Being dominated only rules out an option if it’s dominated by
something which is itself unimpeachable. Thus, in the example above, the fact that every cri>0
is dominated doesn’t rule them out, as every credence function that dominates them is itself
dominated by something else.
Call an option unimpeachable iff no normatively relevant factor tells against it. If we
restrict our attention to cases in which the only normatively relevant factor is X-dominance,
then an option will be unimpeachable iff it’s not X-dominated. Given Pettigrew’s moral — that
being dominated only tells against an option if the dominating option is unimpeachable — this
suggests the following schema:
X-Dominance (v2): If a subject is such that (i) cr is X-dominated by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is not
X-dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
This is, of course, precisely the schema Pettigrew employs.
Dominance (v2) works well if we assume that X-dominance is the only normatively rele-
vant factor. But suppose that’s not the case, and that there are two normatively relevant factors.
Perhaps, in addition to X-dominance, there is also a “side constraint” that directly states that
certain options are impermissible.22 Or perhaps there are two normatively relevant notions of
dominance, X-dominance and Y-dominance. How should we proceed, in order to determine
what options are permissible?
One approach is to apply each of these constraints sequentially. So, for example, one
might first apply a side constraint to narrow down the set of permissible options, and then
appeal to X-Dominance (v2) to narrow down the set of permissible options some more. Or
one might appeal to X-Dominance (v2) to narrow down the set of permissible options, and
then appeal to Y-Dominance (v2) to further narrow down the set of permissible options. The
problem with this approach, as Easwaran & Fitelson (2012) show, is that the final result can
be order-dependent.23 That is, the set of permissible options one is left with after applying
both constraints can depend on the order in which we apply these constraints. This leaves us
in the uncomfortable position of having to decide between different orderings, and of having
to provide some rationale for why this is the right ordering to choose.
22I borrow this “side constraint” terminology from Pettigrew (2013b), who himself borrows it from Nozick (1974).
23Though see Pettigrew’s (2014) for an instance of someone willing to bite the bullet here. (In order to resolve the
tension between the Principal Principle and the Indifference Principle, Pettigrew suggests that we apply the norms that
yield the Principal Principle before we apply those yielding the Indifference Principle.)
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A second approach is to apply both of these constraints to the entire set of options, and
to then take the intersection of the options that remain to be the permissible options. So, for
example, one might take the intersection of the options not ruled out by a side constraint, and
the options not ruled out by X-Dominance (v2). Or one might take the intersection of the
options not ruled out by X-Dominance (v2), and the options not ruled out by Y-Dominance
(v2). This approach avoids the ordering problems that aﬄicted the first approach, since there
is no order in which the constraints are applied — they’re each applied independently.
But this approach is problematic for the same reasons that Dominance (v0) was problem-
atic. For if, say, X-Dominance (v2) and Y-Dominance (v2) jointly rule out every option, then
this approach will entail that every option is impermissible. Assuming that epistemic dilemmas
are impossible, this is a reductio of this approach.24
A third approach avoids this problem by modifying the schema so that being dominated
only rules out a credence function if there are unimpeachable credence functions to be had —
credences functions that are undominated with respect to every normatively relevant notion of
dominance, compatible with any side-constraints, and so on:
X-Dominance (v3): If a subject is such that (i) cr is X-dominated by cr∗, and (ii) there are
unimpeachable credence functions, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
Then, as before, one applies constraints to the entire set of options, and takes the intersection
of what remains to yield the permissible options.
But both the second approach and third approaches yield the wrong results in some cases.
Suppose there are exactly two normatively relevant factors, X-dominance and Y-dominance,
where X-dominance tracks X-utility, and Y-dominance tracks Y-utility. And consider three
credence functions defined over a pair of worlds w1 and w2, whose utilities at each world are:
cr1 cr2 cr3
X-utility: w1 99 100 101
w2 99 100 0
Y-utility: w1 100 99 0
w2 100 99 101
24Again, as mentioned in footnote 21, this is a bit quick, for one can avoid this reductio in other ways, such as by
rejecting the assumption that there are two normatively relevant notions of dominance that will rule out every option
in this way. Again, however, this is an unattractive option: since these schemas are supposed to spell out the general
relationship between normatively relevant notions of dominance and what we ought to believe, one would like to avoid
having to make substantive assumptions about what dominance relations can hold.
In a similar fashion, one can respond to the counterexample given below to both the second and third approaches by
maintaining that there aren’t any normatively relevant notions of dominance that will yield to the pattern of dominance
relations the case describes. But again, this is an unattractive option given that these schemas are supposed to spell out
the general relationship between normatively relevant notions of dominance and what we ought to believe.
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Evaluating this case using the second approach, we find that cr3 is not ruled out as it’s
neither X nor Y-dominated by anything. But cr1 is impermissible because it’s X-dominated by
cr2, and cr2 is X-undominated. And cr2 is impermissible because it’s Y-dominated by cr1, and
cr1 is Y-undominated.
Evaluating this case using the third approach, we find that cr3 is again not ruled out be-
cause it’s neither X nor Y-dominated by anything. (Indeed, since we’ve stipulated that X and
Y-dominance are the only normatively relevant factors, cr3 is unimpeachable.) But cr1 is
impermissible because it’s X-dominated by cr2, and there exist unimpeachable credence func-
tions (i.e., cr3). And cr2 is impermissible because it’s Y-dominated by cr1, and there exist
unimpeachable credence functions.
So both the second and third approaches entail that cr3 is the only permissible credence
function. But these verdicts don’t seem right. For example, every probability function will
take cr1 to have either a higher expected X-utility or a higher expected Y-utility than cr3. And
every probability function which assigns a credence greater than ≈ 0.02 to each world will take
cr1 to have both a higher expected X-utility and a higher expected Y-utility than cr3.
In light of this, let’s consider a fourth approach. Recall Pettigrew’s moral: whether being
dominated is a bad thing depends on the status of what’s doing the dominating. In particular,
being dominated only rules out an option if the dominating option is unimpeachable.
This suggests the following schema:
X-Dominance (v4): If a subject is such that (i) cr is X-dominated by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is unim-
peachable, then it is impermissible for that subject to adopt cr.
And, as before, one applies constraints to the entire set of options, and takes the intersection
of what remains to yield the permissible options.25
If we adopt this fourth approach, then in the example above cr1, cr2 and cr3 will all come
out permissible. The function cr1 won’t be ruled out, for while cr1 is X-dominated by cr2, cr2
isn’t unimpeachable, as it’s Y-dominated by cr1. Likewise, cr2 won’t be ruled out, for while
cr2 is Y-dominated by cr1, cr1 isn’t unimpeachable, as it’s X-dominated by cr2.
I suggest that this fourth approach is the one we should adopt. And Dominance (v4) is the
schema we should employ to formulate dominance principles.
The dominance-style derivations of Bayesian norms provided in the literature tend to use
Dominance (v0) or (v2)-style principles, not Dominance (v4)-style principles.26 The appeal to
Dominance (v2)-style principles is unproblematic if we assume that the notion of dominance
being employed is the only normatively relevant factor, as in that case Dominance (v2) and
Dominance (v4) are equivalent. But the appeal to Dominance (v2)-style principles is prob-
lematic if we assume that there are multiple normatively relevant factors — something we’re
committed to if we want to endorse more than one of these arguments. For if there are mul-
tiple normatively relevant factors, it’s Dominance (v4), not Dominance (v2), that correctly
25In some places, at least, it seems Pettigrew would endorse this fourth approach (e.g., see his argument in favor
of “Dominance-” in section 3 of Pettigrew (2013b), and compare Dominance- to Dominance (v4)). In other places,
however, it Pettigrew seems to prefer the first approach (see footnote 23).
26E.g., see Joyce (2009) for versions of Dominance (v0)-style principles, and Pettigrew (2014) and Pettigrew
(2013a) for versions of Dominance (v2)-style principles.
12
describes how dominance facts bear on what it’s permissible to believe. And once we adopt
these Dominance (v4)-style principles, these derivations of the Bayesian norms may no longer
go through.
3.1 Two Examples
The dominance principle derivations of Bayesian norms given in the literature tend to use Dom-
inance (v0) and (v2)-style principles. I’ve argued that we should replace them with Dominance
(v4)-style principles. But once we make these replacements, and take all of the normatively
relevant factors into account, these derivations of Bayesian norms may no longer go through.
To get a feel for how this goes, let’s work through two simple examples.
For the first example, suppose there to be exactly two normatively relevant factors, strict
dominance and chancy expected dominance. To simplify the discussion, let’s assume we’re
restricting our attention to subjects with no evidence.
Now consider the argument that employs strict dominance to establish Probabilism. It’s
been shown in the literature that every non-probabilistic credence function is strictly dominated
by a credence function which is itself not strictly dominated by anything.27 Given Strict Dom-
inance (v2), this entails that non-probabilistic credence functions are impermissible. But given
Strict Dominance (v4), this entailment doesn’t follow — to show that every non-probabilistic
credence function is impermissible, it needs to be shown that every non-probabilistic credence
function is strictly dominated by a credence function which is itself neither strictly dominated
nor chancy expected dominated. And this is not true. For there are cases in which some non-
probabilistic credence functions are only strictly dominated by credence functions which are
themselves chancy expected dominated.28 Thus, given these assumptions about what’s norma-
tively relevant, Strict Dominance (v4) won’t entail that all non-probabilistic credence functions
are impermissible. And the attempt to establish Probabilism by appealing to strict dominance
won’t work.
That said, given this particular stance regarding what factors are normatively relevant, the
failure of this argument doesn’t really matter. For while the argument from strict dominance
to Probabilism fails, the argument from chancy expected dominance to the Principal Principle
succeeds, and the Principal Principle entails Probabilism. Thus we can replace the argument
from strict dominance to Probabilism with an argument from chancy expected dominance to
Probabilism.
Let’s see how the dominance argument for the Principal Principle goes. Given Chancy Ex-
pected Dominance (v4), showing that every Principal Principle-violating (or “PP-violating”)
credence function is impermissible requires showing that every PP-violating credence function
27E.g., see Pettigrew (2013c) and the references therein.
28The existence of such cases was shown by Easwaran & Fitelson (2012). Here is a simplified version of such
a case, offered by Pettigrew (2013b). Consider a subject with a credence of 3/5 in both A and ¬A, who knows that
the chance of A is 3/5, and knows nothing else about the chances (such as the chance of ¬A). As Pettigrew (2013b)
shows, the subject’s non-probabilistic credences will be strictly dominated by a narrow band of probabilistic credence
functions which assign values of around 1/2 to A and ¬A. But since none of these probabilistic credence functions
assign 3/5 to A, all of them are chancy expected dominated.
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is chancy expected dominated by a credence function which is itself neither chancy expected
dominated nor strictly dominated. Pettigrew (2013a) shows that every PP-violating credence
function will be chancy expected dominated by a PP-satisfying credence function which is
not chancy expected dominated. Furthermore, every PP-satisfying credence function is proba-
bilistic, and no probabilistic credence function is strictly dominated.29 Thus every PP-violating
credence function is chancy expected dominated by a credence function which is itself neither
chancy expected dominated nor strictly dominated. And so, given these assumptions about
what factors are normatively relevant, Chancy Expected Dominance (v4) will entail that all
PP-violating credence functions are impermissible. And thus the attempt to establish the Prin-
cipal Principle by appealing to chancy expected dominance succeeds.
Let’s turn to the second example. As before, suppose that there are exactly two normatively
relevant factors, but this time let these factors be chancy expected dominance and worst-case
dominance. To simplify things, let’s again assume that we’re restricting our attention to sub-
jects with no evidence.
Let’s start by assessing the prospects for a dominance argument for the Indifference Prin-
ciple. Pettigrew (2014) shows that every Indifference Principle-violating (or “IP-violating”)
credence function is worst-case dominated by the IP-satisfying credence function which is
itself not worst-case dominated. And given Worst Case Dominance (v2), this would entail
that violating the Indifference Principle is impermissible. But given Worst Case Dominance
(v4), more needs to be shown: it needs to be shown that every IP-violating credence func-
tion is worst-case dominated by a credence function which is itself not worst-case dominated
and not chancy expected dominated. And, given some mild assumptions about chance as-
signments, this won’t be true.30 The only function which is isn’t worst-case dominated —
the IP-satisfying credence function — will be chancy expected dominated by other credence
functions.31 Thus, given these assumptions about what’s normatively relevant, Worst Case
Dominance (v4) won’t entail that violating the Indifference Principle is impermissible. And
thus the dominance argument for the Indifference Principle fails.
Likewise, the dominance argument for the Principal Principle fails. To show that violating
29E.g., see Joyce (1998).
30For example, the following assumptions suffice: (1) some ur-chance function (i.e., possible initial chance func-
tion) assigns a different non-zero value to some pair of worlds, and (2) the assignments of ur-chance functions don’t
overlap; i.e., they assign non-zero values to disjoint sets of worlds. (This second assumption will be disputed by some
proponents of Humean accounts of chance. But this argument for the Principal Principle is supposed to be independent
of whether one is a Humean.)
31One can see this intuitively as follows. Pettigrew’s derivation shows that credence functions conditional on E
that aren’t mixtures of the possible chance functions which assign 1 to E will be chancy expected dominated. For
subjects with no evidence, it follows that credence functions that aren’t mixtures of the possible chance functions will
be chancy expected dominated. Now, suppose that (1) some ur-chance function ch assigns a different non-zero value
to some pair of worlds, call them w1 and w2, and (2) ur-chance functions don’t overlap; i.e., they assign non-zero
values to disjoint sets of worlds. Given (1) and (2), the IP-satisfying credence function can’t be a mixture of ur-chance
functions. For the IP-satisfying credence function will assign the same non-zero value to w1 and w2, while any mixture
of ur-chance functions satisfying (1) and (2) must assign w1 and w2 either 0 (if ch gets zero weight in the mixture)
or distinct non-zero values (if ch gets non-zero weight in the mixture). And since the IP-satisfying credence function
can’t be a mixture of ur-chance functions, it will be chancy expected dominated.
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the Principal Principle is impermissible given Chancy Expected Dominance (v4), it needs to be
shown that every PP-violating credence function is chancy expected dominated by a credence
function which is itself neither chancy expected dominated nor worst-case dominated. But
given the same mild assumptions as before, there won’t be any such function — the only
functions which aren’t chancy expected dominated will be worst-case dominated. So, given
these assumptions about what’s normatively relevant, Chancy Expected Dominance (v4) won’t
entail that violating the Principal Principle is impermissible. And thus the argument from
chancy expected dominance to the Principal Principle fails. So, given these assumptions about
what’s normatively relevant, Chancy Expected Dominance (v4) won’t entail that violating the
Principal Principle is impermissible, and the dominance argument for the Principal Principle
will fail.32
These are two simple examples of how scoring rule arguments for Bayesian norms can
break down once we move to Dominance (v4)-style principles, as I’ve argued we should.
In both of these examples there are only two epistemically relevant factors in play. More
plausible stances will take there to be more than two epistemically relevant factors.33 But the
general moral is the same for both simple stances and more complicated ones. In order to
assess whether an argument for a Bayesian norm goes through, we need to be aware of, and
take into consideration, all of the normatively relevant factors. And the fact that an argument
goes through in the special case in which there’s only one normatively relevant factor is no
indication that it’ll still go through after we introduce other normatively relevant factors.
3.2 Summing Up
Let’s take stock. I’ve argued that the dominance arguments for Bayesian norms should adopt
Dominance (v4)-style principles. If this is right, then the dominance arguments for Bayesian
norms which appeal to Dominance (v0) or (v2)-style principles are no good. And while ar-
guments employing Dominance (v2)-style principles suffice in cases in which the notion of
32In this case these failures are predictable, since (given the kinds of mild assumptions described in footnote 30)
the Principal Principle and Pettigrew’s Indifference Principle will yield inconsistent prescriptions. Thus, if one’s set
up one’s framework correctly, it shouldn’t follow that subjects are obligated to satisfy both the Principal Principle and
the Indifference Principle. (The fact that the Dominance (v4) schema yields this result is a mark in favor of it over
(say) the Dominance (v0) and (v2) schemas, which will inconsistently require subjects to satisfy both.) But even in
cases in which these failures are not predictable, the same general points hold. We need to be careful to track all of the
normatively relevant factors in play, and see whether the argument goes through given those factors. For the fact that
these arguments work in the special case in which there’s only one normatively relevant factor is no indication that
they’ll continue to work once other normatively relevant factors are added into the mix.
33Of course, there’s a sense in which proponents of Veritism will ultimately want the only epistemically relevant
factor to be accuracy. But they can still maintain that there are several different kinds of dominance that are all
grounded by this concern, and which should all be taken into account when evaluating whether a credence function
is permissible. In any case, the main thrust of this section — that the standard scoring rule arguments that have been
provided for these Bayesian norms aren’t compelling if we take there to be multiple normatively relevant factors in
play, and that if we want to endorse more than one of these arguments, we need to show that we can construct analogs
of these arguments that take all of the epistemically relevant factors into account — is independent of the question of
Veritism.
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dominance being employed is the only relevant factor (since in these cases the Dominance
(v2) and (v4) schemas are equivalent), these arguments aren’t compelling when there are mul-
tiple normatively relevant factors in play, as we’re required to think if we want to endorse more
than one of these arguments at the same time.
Once we realize that we need to adopt Dominance (v4)-style principles, our assessments
of the arguments for Bayesian norms becomes a more holistic process. For what a Dominance
(v4)-style principle takes to be impermissible will depend on what credence functions are
unimpeachable, and thus on what exactly the normatively relevant considerations are. And
this makes establishing that (say) it’s impermissible to violate the Principal Principle a much
trickier task. For this isn’t something one can establish on its own, once and for all. Rather,
one can only show that, given that such and such are all of the normatively relevant factors,
it’s impermissible to violate the Principal Principle. And any time one wants to take a different
stance with respect to what the normatively relevant factors are, the argument needs to be
revisited.34
4 Purely Alethic Justification
Advocates of the All-Accuracy Approach take existing scoring rule arguments to provide com-
patible purely alethic justifications for many Bayesian norms, including evidential Bayesian
norms. In the last section we considered whether these arguments provide compatible justifi-
cations. In this section, we’ll turn to consider whether these arguments provide purely alethic
justifications; i.e., justifications that don’t appeal to any epistemic value other than that of
having accurate beliefs.
Why think that the scoring rule arguments that have been given for these norms yield purely
alethic justifications? The most explicit argument for this claim comes from Pettigrew (2013b).
Pettigrew replies to Easwaran & Fitelson (2012) worries regarding the compatibility of Joyce’s
Vertism and evidential norms as follows:
“Joyce’s argument assumes that the only goal of a credal state is accuracy... That is,
Joyce’s argument assumes a version of credal virtue monism. ... I wish to defend
the monism required for Joyce’s argument... The major stumbling block for this
version of credal value monism is that there seem to be evidential norms; and their
force seems to stem from the evidential goals at which they demand that we aim.
...we agree that the evidential norms hold, but we show that they follow from the
goal of accuracy alone, not from a distinct evidential goal. ...
34Although this discussion has followed Pettigrew in focusing on dominance-style decision-theoretic principles, I
take the general moral to apply regardless of what kinds of decision-theoretic principles are in play. Namely: if there
are multiple normatively relevant factors to take into consideration, then a plausible account of what’s permissible will
be holistic. One can model this holism by appealing to a set of rules that cross-reference each other (as in the text),
or by adopting a single decision-theoretic principle which takes all of these factors into account. But either way, one
will need to settle on what the normatively relevant factors are before one can demonstrate whether a given option is
permissible or impermissible.
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My strategy is this: Recall the form of Joyce’s argument for Probabilism as I pre-
sented it above. It has two components: the first is the claim that the measure
of accuracy — namely, the negative Brier score — measures cognitive value; the
second is a decision-theoretic norm, namely, [Strict] Dominance. From these, via
a mathematical theorem, Joyce derives Probabilism. I claim that any evidential
norm can be derived in the same manner. We retain the first component, namely,
the identification of cognitive value with accuracy — this is the core of veritism.
But we change the decision-theoretic norm. Different decision-theoretic norms
give rise to different credal norms, some of which are the evidential norms we
wish to recover.”35
More concisely, Pettigrew’s case for maintaining that there are scoring rule arguments
that provide purely alethic justifications for the main Bayesian norms goes as follows. First,
Pettigrew makes the following claim:
Claim. If one can derive a norm using a purely alethic epistemic utility function (a function
that takes only considerations regarding accuracy into account) and a decision-theoretic
rule that employs this utility function, then one has provided a purely alethic justification
for that norm.
Second, Pettigrew holds that the utility function associated with the Brier score is purely
alethic. Third, Pettigrew notes that there are scoring rule arguments which show how one
can derive the main Bayesian norms by plugging this utility function into various decision-
theoretic dominance rules. Together, these three claims entail that there are scoring rule argu-
ments which provide purely alethic justifications for these Bayesian norms.
But this argument is unsound. It’s unsound because Claim is false. Deriving a norm
using an alethic utility function and a decision rule doesn’t show that we have a purely alethic
justification for that norm. For while the utility function may be alethic, the decision rule need
not be. And if we employ a decision rule that takes factors other than accuracy into account,
then our justification of the norm won’t be purely alethic.
Let’s look at a couple examples. Consider a decision rule that takes a utility function,
ignores it, and then declares every option permissible. One could use the Brier-based utility
function and this decision rule to derive:
Permission: Every credence function is permissible.
Given Claim, it follows that we’ve provided a purely alethic justification for this norm. But, of
course, we’ve done nothing of the kind — the derivation of this norm has nothing to do with
accuracy.
For another example, consider a decision rule that takes a utility function, evaluates the
expected utility of each credence function (relative to the credences of the subject whose epis-
temic obligations we’re assessing), and takes a credence function to be permissible iff it mini-
mizes expected utility. One could use the Brier utility function and this decision rule to derive
the negation of Probabilism. Given Claim, it follows that we have a purely alethic justification
35Pettigrew (2013b), p591-592.
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for rejecting Probabilism. Again, this is clearly incorrect — for while this decision rule and
utility function combination does take accuracy into account, it’s aiming away from the truth,
not towards it.
Here’s a third example. Let G be the proposition that God exists. And let’s say that cr
is G dominated by cr∗ for the subject iff cr(G) < cr∗(G). Now suppose someone adopted, as
decision rules, both Straight Dominance and:
G Dominance: If a subject is such that (i) cr is G dominated by cr∗, and (ii) cr∗ is not G
dominated by any cr∗∗, then it is impermissible for her to adopt cr.36
Using the Brier-based utility function score and these decision rules, one can derive:
Theism: It’s impermissible to adopt any credence function for which cr(G) < 1.37
Given Claim, it follows that we have a purely alethic justification for Theism. But this is
wrong. For even though these decision rules do take accuracy into account, and are to some
extent aiming towards the truth, accuracy isn’t the only thing they’re taking into account. Thus
this derivation hasn’t provided us with a purely alethic justification for Theism.
So Pettigrew’s case for why these scoring rule arguments provide purely alethic justifi-
cations for evidential Bayesian norms is unconvincing. For his case hangs crucially on the
truth of Claim — that being able to derive a norm from a purely alethic utility function and
a decision-theoretic rule provides a purely alethic justification for that norm. But, as we’ve
seen, Claim is false. For one can’t determine whether we have a purely alethic justification
just by ensuring that the utility function one employs is alethic. One also has to ensure that
the decision-theoretic rule being employed is alethic, and that the combination of the utility
function and the decision-theoretic rule remain alethic.
Let’s take a step back from the particular details of Pettigrew’s argument. One can see more
generally that the scoring rule arguments that have been offered are, by themselves, of little use
in addressing the initial worry regarding whether one can provide purely alethic justifications
for evidential norms.
Recall the initial worry sketched in section 1. Purely alethic justifications can only appeal
to the goal of accuracy, but evidential norms also seem to aim at the goal of having beliefs
that line up with the evidence. And the goals of accuracy and lining up with the evidence can,
it seems, come apart. So it’s not clear how one could provide purely alethic justifications for
evidential norms.
Now, the scoring rule arguments for evidential norms that have been offered all employ
decision-theoretic rules in which evidence plays a key normative role. The use to these decision-
36For the reasons discussed in section 3, the second clause of both Straight Dominance and G Dominance should be
“(ii) cr∗ is unimpeachable”, or (if straight dominance and G dominance are the only normatively relevant factors) “(ii)
cr∗ is neither straight dominated nor G dominated by any cr∗∗”. But since I’m bracketing these issues for the purposes
of this section, I’ve just followed Pettigrew in formulating these principles using the Dominance (v3) schema.
37There are, of course, plenty of historical examples of people arguing that we’re rationally committed to a norm
like this. But regardless of what one thinks of the merits of those arguments, no one would take this argument to
provide a purely alethic justification for Theism. (Among other things, one can swap G with any proposition one likes
— say, the proposition that goblins exist — and get an argument of exactly the same form.)
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theoretic rules suggests that these derivations are taking potentially non-alethic factors — evi-
dence — into account. And we haven’t been given any story for how these appeals to evidence
follow from purely alethic goals. So these scoring rule arguments for evidential norms don’t ul-
timately do anything to address the initial worry we started with. They simply shift the burden
from that of showing how to provide purely alethic justifications for evidential norms to that of
showing how to provide purely alethic justifications for evidence-employing decision-theoretic
principles. And this burden is no easier to meet.38
5 On the Possibility of Purely Alethic Justification
In the previous section we considered whether the scoring rule arguments that have been of-
fered for evidential Bayesian norms yield purely alethic justifications for those norms. I argued
that in order to show that these arguments provide purely alethic justifications, one would need
to show that the decision-theoretic principles these arguments employ are themselves purely
alethic. And this has yet to be done. But this discussion leaves open the possibility that some-
one could provide such a justification. Let’s now turn to consider whether providing such
a justification is possible. That is, let’s consider the question of whether providing a purely
alethic justification for evidential norms is possible.
In order to provide a purely alethic justification for a norm, the norm itself needs to be
purely alethic; that is, the norm itself needs to make prescriptions which depend only on “truth-
seeking” or alethically acceptable factors.39 If changes to alethically unacceptable factors
change the norm’s prescriptions, then it won’t be possible to provide a purely alethic justifica-
tion for the norm — for the norm takes factors other than alethic factors into account. So if
we want to determine whether it’s possible to provide a purely alethic justification for a given
norm, the first thing to do is to assess whether the norm’s prescriptions take only alethically
acceptable factors into consideration.
38This is not, of course, to say that this burden can’t be met. (For example, one can see some of the work done by
Easwaran (2014) as an attempt to discharge part of this burden.) But by and large, little has been done to try to provide
purely alethic justifications for the decision-theoretic principles that the arguments sketched in section 2.3 employ.
39The claim that one can only provide purely alethic justifications for purely alethic norms is, strictly speaking,
only true for what one might call “epistemic ur-norms”: conjunctions of every epistemic norm, which yield all of the
facts regarding what’s epistemically permissible (with respect to a certain mode of evaluation). To see why, suppose
one provided a purely alethic justification for some principle X. One could decompose X into two principles, X1 and
X2, where X1 imposes all and only the normative constraints that X imposes in cases involving something purple,
and X2 imposes all and only the normative constraints that X imposes in cases not involving something purple. Then
we’d have a purely alethic justifications for X1 (since we have a purely alethic justification for X, and X entails X1),
even through X1 is not purely alethic (because it’s prescriptions partially depend on non-alethic factors; e.g., whether
purple things are involved).
That said, except for special cases in which the individual norms are gruesome decompositions of purely alethic
norms (as in the case described above), the claim will also hold for individual norms. I.e., unless it’s part of a gruesome
decomposition, an individual norm will be susceptible to purely alethic justification iff it’s purely alethic. And since
the kinds of individual norms discussed in the literature are not gruesome decompositions of this kind, we can generally
proceed as if this claim holds for individual norms without worry.
19
Of course, determining whether a factor is alethically acceptable can be tricky. For whether
a factor is alethically acceptable depends on what kind of normative evaluation we’re perform-
ing.
To see why, let’s first consider a similar issue in ethics. Suppose you’re a consequentialist.
Then you’ll hold that the correct moral norms will make prescriptions which only depend on
“best-outcome seeking” or “consequentially acceptable” factors. But what factors count as
consequentially acceptable will depend on the kind of normative evaluations you’re concerned
with. For example, you might be concerned with:
objective evaluations: what a subject should do given what will bring about the best results,
subjective evaluations: what a subject should do given what she believes will bring about the
best results, or
prospective evaluations: what a subject should do given what she should believe will bring
about the best results.
Consider your beliefs about the outcomes of acts. Whether these beliefs are a consequentially
acceptable factor will depend on which of these kinds of evaluations you’re performing. If
you’re performing an objective evaluation, then your beliefs about the outcomes of acts are
independent of what you should do, and (thus) such beliefs are not a consequentially acceptable
factor. If, on the other hand, you’re performing a subjective evaluation, then your beliefs
about the outcomes of acts are essential to determining what you should do, and thus are a
consequentially acceptable factor.
If you’re a Veritist, then you’ll hold that the correct epistemic norms will make prescrip-
tions which only depend on “truth seeking” or “alethically acceptable” factors. But what fac-
tors count as alethically acceptable will depend on the kind of normative evaluations you’re
concerned with; e.g.:
objective evaluations: what a subject should believe given what is true,
subjective evaluations: what a subject should believe given what she believes to be true, or
prospective evaluations: what a subject should believe given what she should believe to be
true.
So consider what factors should play into one’s verdicts if one is concerned with purely alethic
justifications. If one is performing an objective evaluation, then the only factors relevant to the
verdict should be the cr being evaluated, and the truth values of the propositions cr assigns
values to (yielding a verdict which is relative to the world w at which we’re evaluating cr). If
one is performing a subjective evaluation, then the only factors relevant to the verdict should be
the cr being evaluated, and the subject’s credences (crs) in the propositions cr assigns values
to (yielding a verdict which is relative to the subject for which we’re evaluating cr). And if one
is performing a prospective evaluation, then the only factors relevant to the verdict should be
the cr being evaluated, and the credences the subject should have (crsp) in the propositions cr
assigns values to (yielding a verdict which is relative to the subject for which we’re evaluating
cr).
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What kind of evaluation are we concerned with here? At first glance, it doesn’t seem like
we’re concerned with objective evaluations of what a subject should believe. For what a sub-
ject objectively ought to believe, it seems, is just whatever’s true, and that yields a distinctly
uninteresting batch of prescriptions. Likewise, at first glance, it doesn’t seem like we’re con-
cerned with proscriptive evaluations of what a subject should believe. For on this approach one
would be required to plug in what a subject should believe in order to figure out what a subject
should believe, which threatens to be circular. This suggests that it’s something like subjective
evaluation that we’re concerned with. Moreover, a perusal of the literature on scoring rule
arguments makes it clear that it’s subjective evaluation that this literature is concerned with.
(E.g., consider the focus on the expected epistemic utility of adopting a credence function, the
appeal to constraints like Propriety which presuppose the relevance of maximizing expected
utility, and so on.) So in what follows, let’s narrow our focus to the following question: is
providing a purely alethic subjective justification for evidential norms possible?
In order to provide a purely alethic justification for a norm, the norm must make pre-
scriptions which depend only on alethically acceptable factors. Given a subjective mode of
evaluation, the only alethically acceptable factors are the cr being evaluated and the subject’s
credences crs. So the following is a necessary condition on being able to provide a purely
alethic subjective justification for a norm:
Supervenience: One can’t alter the verdicts of the norm without altering either the credence
function cr being evaluated or the credences of the subject crs with respect to which the
evaluation is being performed.
At first glance, none of the evidential Bayesian norms we considered in section 2.3 appear
to satisfy this condition (though, as we’ll see in a moment, this depends on the notion of
evidence we employ). In all three cases, it seems, one can flip a verdict from permissible to
impermissible by tweaking the subject’s evidence, while leaving cr and crs unchanged.
Consider Conditionalization. Suppose a subject has a credence of 1/2 in A (crs(A) = 1/2),
receives E as evidence, and we’re evaluating whether it’s permissible for her to adopt a cre-
dence function that assigns a credence of 1 to A (cr(A) = 1). If E = A, then according to
Conditionalization adopting cr could be permissible. But if E = > (the tautology), then ac-
cording to Conditionalization adopting cr would be impermissible. Thus we have a case where
Conditionalization flips its verdicts, even though cr and crs remain unchanged.
Or consider the Principal Principle. Suppose a subject has credences crs, total evidence E,
and we’re evaluating whether a credence function that assigns a credence of 1/2 to A (cr(A) =
1/2) is permissible. If E = the proposition that the chance of A is 1/2, then according to the
Principal Principle holding cr could be permissible. But if E = the proposition that the chance
of A is 1, then according to the Principal Principle holding cr is impermissible.
Or consider the Indifference Principle. Suppose a subject has credences crs, total evidence
E, and the credence function cr being evaluated is such that cr(w1) , cr(w2). If E = w1, then
according to the Indifference Principle holding cr could be permissible. But if E = >, then
according to the Indifference Principle holding cr is impermissible.
So, it seems, none of the evidential Bayesian norms we’ve considered satisfy Superve-
nience. More generally, since all we need to construct a counterexample to the condition is
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for the norm’s verdicts to take the subject’s evidence into account, it seems that no evidential
norm could satisfy this condition. Thus, it seems, it’s not possible to provide a purely alethic
subjective justification for evidential norms.
There is, however, a way to avoid this conclusion. Howson & Urbach (1993) have sug-
gested a picture of evidence on which a subject’s evidence is just whatever the subject has
a credence of 1 in. If we adopt this picture of evidence, then one can’t change a subject’s
evidence without also changing her credences. Thus on this picture of evidence all of the
counterexamples to Supervenience considered above, which involve changing the subject’s
evidence while leaving her credences the same, are impossible. So if we adopt something like
Howson and Urbach’s picture of evidence, we can maintain that evidential norms can satisfy
Supervenience.40
But defending the possibility of purely alethic justifications for evidential norms this way
has some big drawbacks. Many people (like me) don’t like Howson and Urbach’s thin picture
of evidence, and would prefer to endorse a more substantive picture of evidence.41 And this
way of defending the possibility of purely alethic justifications for evidential norms is of little
help to such people.
Moreover, proponents of substantive evidence will be actively hostile to the prospect of
justifying versions of these evidential norms that employ Howson and Urbach’s notion of evi-
dence. This is because they’ll take the Howson and Urbach versions of these norms to be false,
and thus impossible to successfully justify.
Consider Conditionalization. Suppose a subject is hit on the head with a rock, and as a
result of this mental trauma, comes to have a credence of 1 that unicorns exist.42 The version of
40Note that to get the evidential norms to satisfy Supervenience, it’s crucial that one’s account of evidence be such
that one has E as evidence iff one has a credence of 1 in E, as per Howson and Urbach’s account. Merely having the
entailment go one way or the other won’t suffice.
To see this, first consider accounts on which having E as evidence entails having a credence of 1 in E, but not vice
versa. E.g., consider something like Williamson’s (2000) account, on which one has evidence E iff one knows E.
Suppose a subject comes to have a credence of 1 in E by coming to know E. Then, given this account of evidence,
Conditionalization will prescribe conditionalizing on E. On the other hand, suppose a subject comes to have a credence
of 1 in E but doesn’t know E. Then Conditionalization won’t prescribe conditionalizing on E. So given this account
of evidence, subjects with the same credences can be given different prescriptions by evidential norms. So evidential
norms will fail to satisfy Supervenience.
Second, consider accounts on which having having a credence of 1 in E entails that E is evidence, but not vice versa.
E.g., consider an account on which one has evidence E iff one has a credence of 1 in E or one has been told E by an
authoritative source. Suppose a subject has a credence of 1/2 in E and has been told E by an authoritative source. Then,
given this account of evidence, Conditionalization will prescribe conditionalizing on E. On the other hand, suppose a
subject has a credence of 1/2 in E and hasn’t been told E by an authoritative source. Then Conditionalization won’t
prescribe conditionalizing on E. So given this account of evidence, subjects with the same credences can be given
different prescriptions by evidential norms. So again, evidential norms will fail to satisfy Supervenience.
41I take Howson and Urbach’s picture of evidence to be “thin” in the sense that it provides a reductive analysis
of evidence in terms of other components of the Bayesian apparatus (i.e., credence). Proponents of more substantive
pictures of evidence, which can’t be reduced in this way, include Lewis (1996), Williamson (2000), Neta (2008) and
Dunn (2010).
42For a lengthier discussion of this kind of case, and of different ways of thinking about evidence, see Dunn (2010).
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Conditionalization that employs Howson and Urbach’s notion of evidence will take this to be a
case of receiving evidence, and will maintain that the subject should adopt the credences they’d
get by conditionalizing on the proposition that unicorns exist. Pretty much every version of
Conditionalization that employs a more substantive notion of evidence, on the other hand, will
not take this to be a case of receiving evidence, and will maintain that the subject’s credences
should remain the same. So these two different understandings of Conditionalization will
yield conflicting prescriptions. And thus proponents of the substantive evidence version of
Conditionalization will take the Howson and Urbach version to be false, and hence something
which can’t be successfully justified.
The same is true for other evidential norms, like the Principal Principle and the Indiffer-
ence Principle. The Howson and Urbach versions of these norms will yield prescriptions that
conflict with those of the substantive evidence versions of these principles. And thus propo-
nents of the substantive evidence versions of these principles will take the Howson and Urbach
versions of these principles to be false, and any purported justifications of them erroneous.
So proponents of substantive evidence will not just fail to be mollified by the possibility
of providing a purely alethic justification for the Howson and Urbach versions of these norms.
They’ll be actively hostile to the idea of there being successful justifications for these norms
(whether purely alethic or not), because they’ll take these norms to be false.
So is it possible to provide purely alethic (subjective) justifications for evidential norms?
Unless one adopts something like Howson and Urbach’s picture of evidence, and the corre-
sponding understanding of these norms, the answer is “no”. And, as proponents of substantive
evidence have argued, there are a number of reasons to dislike Howson and Urbach’s picture
of evidence.43,44
6 Purely Alethic Justification and Content-Sensitive Norms
In the previous section, we considered whether it’s possible to provide purely alethic (subjec-
tive) justifications for evidential norms. I argued that it’s not, unless you buy something like
the contentious picture of evidence proposed by Howson and Urbach, and the corresponding
43For an in-depth discussion of these issues, and further references, see Dunn (2010).
44It’s natural to wonder here whether the assumption that evidence is veridical could provide one with a way to
construct purely alethic justifications for evidential norms. If we were concerned with objective justification, and
were assessing what a subject should believe given what’s true, then the assumption that any proposition one receives
as evidence is true might help. But if we’re concerned with subjective justification, and assessing what a subject
should believe given what she believes to be true, then it’s whether the subject believes her evidence is true, not
whether it’s actually true, that will matter. Thus while this veridicality assumption might help with providing purely
alethic objective justifications for evidential norms, it won’t help to provide purely alethic subjective justifications for
evidential norms. And it’s subjective justifications that the scoring rule literature we’re discussing is concerned with.
(Note that Howson and Urbach’s account of evidence entails that subjects always believe their evidence is true.
So insofar as the thought was to improve our odds of being able to provide purely alethic justifications for evidential
norms by adopting an account of evidence on which evidence is veridical, or has whatever analog of veridicality that’s
relevant to the mode of evaluation we’re concerned with, then Howson and Urbach’s account already has the desired
features in the context of subjective evaluations.)
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contentious understanding of these evidential norms. In this section let’s consider how things
go if we do grant something like Howson and Urbach’s picture of evidence. In particular, let’s
consider whether, even given this picture of evidence, it’s possible to provide purely alethic jus-
tifications for evidential norms whose prescriptions concern particular kinds of propositions,
like the Principal Principle.
Here is a prima facie reason to worry about the possibility of such justifications. One can
only provide a purely alethic justification for a norm that’s purely alethic — a norm that cares
only about accuracy, and directs subjects to adopt the most accurate beliefs they can.45 In the
case of purely alethic subjective justification, this will be accuracy as assessed by the evaluat-
ing credence function. Every other factor about a subject’s doxastic state should be irrelevant.
For example, the content of the beliefs we’re evaluating shouldn’t matter, just whether they’re
accurate. Now, it seems like norms whose prescriptions concern particular kinds of proposi-
tions will necessarily take the content of the propositions we’re evaluating into account. For
example, the Principal Principle will treat some kinds of propositions — propositions about
chances — differently from other propositions. But if this is right, then it seems norms whose
prescriptions concern particular kinds of propositions, like the Principal Principle, can’t be
given purely alethic justifications.
Let’s see how one might make this worry more precise. As we saw in the last section, one
can’t provide a purely alethic justification for a norm if its prescriptions depend on alethically
unacceptable factors. Given a subjective mode of evaluation, this yields Supervenience as a
necessary condition on being able to provide a purely alethic justification for a norm. But this
isn’t the only constraint that a norm must satisfy in order to be susceptible to purely alethic
justification. For a norm could make prescriptions that depend only on alethically acceptable
factors (and thus satisfy Supervenience), and yet use these factors to direct subjects away from
the truth, or in directions orthogonal to the truth.
Some further constraints on such norms are suggested by the discussion of alethic utility
functions in section 2.2. We saw it suggested there that alethic utility functions should satisfy
constraints like Truth-Directedness and Extensionality. One natural thought is to try to trans-
form these constraints on utility functions into constraints on norms. Let’s see how one might
do that. In particular, given the prima facie worry sketched above, let’s see how one might
transform the Extenstionality constraint on utility functions into an analogous constraint on
norms.46
Recall the form of the Extensionality constraint on utility functions:
Extensionality: Let fw,w∗ : F→ F be a bijection between true and false propositions at w with
true and false propositions at w∗; i.e. if fw,w∗(A) = B, then either A is true at w and B is
45In the case of purely alethic subjective justification, this will be accuracy assessed with respect to the evaluating
credence function. Again, strictly speaking, this is only true for the epistemic “ur-norm”, not individual norms; see
footnote 39. But, again, given the kinds of individual norms we’re concerned with, we can put this caveat aside.
46To be clear, I won’t be providing anything like a theorem linking the adoption of Extensionality to the adoption
of an analogous constraint on norms (which I call Extensional Prescriptions, below). Rather, I’ll be arguing that (i)
Extensional Prescriptions is the analog of Extensionality in the case of norms, and (ii) the same thoughts that motivate
Extensionality also motivate Extensional Prescriptions.
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true at w∗, or A is false at w and B is false at w∗. If cr and cr∗ are such that, for all A,
cr(A) = cr∗( fw,w∗(A)), then U(cr,w) = U(cr∗,w∗).
This condition requires utility functions to not care about the content of propositions. It
says that if you have a mapping f from propositions at w to propositions at w∗ that preserves
truth value, and if the values cr assigns to these propositions are the same as the values cr∗
assigns to what f maps them to, then the epistemic utility of holding cr at w is the same as the
epistemic utility of holding cr∗ at w∗. Why? Because (the proponent of Extensionality says)
all that matters to the epistemic utility of a credal state is how close or far its beliefs are from
what’s true. Thus permuting which beliefs are close or far from the truth shouldn’t make a
difference to the utility of holding those beliefs.
How should we formulate an analogous constraint on norms, given that we’re interested
in assessing credal states using a subjective mode of evaluation? To get such a constraint,
we need to change a couple things. First, since we’re performing a subjective evaluation, we
want a constraint which employs what the evaluating subject believes to be true or false in
place of what’s actually true or false. So we’ll want to replace appeals to w/w∗ with appeals
to evaluating credence functions crs/cr∗s . And we’ll want to replace appeals to the truth values
of propositions at w/w∗ with appeals to the credence assigned to those propositions by crs/cr∗s .
Second, since we want a constraint on prescriptions instead of utility assignments, we want a
constraint which bears on the permissibility of credal states instead of the utility assignments
to credal states. So we’ll want to replace the requirement that U(cr,w) = U(cr∗,w∗) with
requirement that cr have the same deontic status with respect to crs as cr∗ has with respect to
cr∗s .
Making these substitutions gives us:
Extensional Prescriptions: Let fcrs,cr∗s : F→ F be a bijection that pairs propositions assigned
a given value by crs with propositions assigned the same value by cr∗s ; i.e., if fcrs,cr∗s (A) =
B, then crs(A) = cr∗s(B). If cr and cr∗ are such that, for all A, cr(A) = cr∗( fcrs,cr∗s (A)), then
cr has the same deontic status with respect to crs as cr∗ has with respect to cr∗s .
This condition requires norms to not care about the content of propositions. It says that
if you have a mapping f from propositions to propositions such that the values crs assigns to
these propositions are the same as the values cr∗s assigns to what f maps them to, and if the
values cr assigns to these propositions are the same as the values cr∗ assigns to what f maps
them to, then the deontic status of holding cr (assessed with respect to crs) is the same as the
deontic status of holding cr∗ (assessed with respect to cr∗s). Why? Because (the proponent of
Extensional Prescriptions says) given a subjective mode of evaluation, all that matters to the
deontic status of a credal state is how close or far it is from what the evaluating credal state
believes to be true. Thus permuting which beliefs are close or far from what the evaluating
credal state believes to be true shouldn’t make a difference to the deontic status of the credal
state.47
47In the text I grant Extensionality, and then proceed, via the most straightforward way of transforming Extensional-
ity into a constraint on norms, to obtain Extensional Prescriptions. But I think Extensional Prescriptions is not the most
plausible constraint on norms of its kind. A more plausible principle would further restrict the bijections it appeals
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Compatibility with Extensional Prescriptions, like compatibility with Supervenience, is a
plausible necessary condition on being able to provide a purely alethic subjective justification
for a norm. Thus if content-sensitive norms like the Principal Principle are incompatible with
Extensional Prescriptions, then it seems that such norms can’t be given purely alethic subjec-
tive justifications. And given some widely held assumptions, content-sensitive norms like the
Principal Principle will conflict with Extensional Prescriptions. Let’s see why this is so in the
case of the Principal Principle, by working through an example.
Let crs be a probabilistic credence function such that:
crs(〈ch(F) = 1/4〉) = 2/3 crs(F) = 1/3
crs(〈ch(F) = 1/2〉) = 1/3 crs(G) = 1/2
Note that these assignments are compatible with the Principal Principle.48 Let’s stipulate that
all of crs’s other assignments are compatible with the Principal Principle as well. Let’s further
stipulate that crs’s assignments are compatible with every other constraint on credences that
one wants to impose, as long as these constraints are compatible with the Principal Principle.49
Even though crs satisfies all these constraints, one might still hold that crs is impermissible
if evaluated with respect to a credence function that assigns very different values than crs. For
such a credence function will take crs’s assignments to be far from the truth. But these worries
won’t arise if we’re evaluating crs with respect to a credence function that assigns the same
values as crs. And we have no other reason to worry about crs’s permissibility, since we’ve
granted that crs is compatible with every other constraint one might want. Thus everyone in
this debate will grant that crs is permissible with respect to itself.
Premise 1. crs is permissible with respect to crs.
Let cr∗s be a credence function which flips crs’s assignments to F and G, and assigns the
same values as crs to every other proposition. Thus:
cr∗s(〈ch(F) = 1/4〉) = 2/3 cr∗s(F) = 1/2
cr∗s(〈ch(F) = 1/2〉) = 1/3 cr∗s(G) = 1/3
Note that these assignments are incompatible with the Principal Principle.50 So, given the
to, in order to avoid potential worries regarding the equivalence of probability-satisfying and probability-violating
credence assignments. Such a principle, call it Extensional Prescriptions∗, would add the following requirement to the
bijection f : it must map worlds to worlds, and map propositions corresponding to each set of worlds (e.g., {w1,w2, ...})
to propositions corresponding to the set of worlds those worlds are mapped to (i.e., { f (w1), f (w2), ...}).
Working backwards, one could appeal to Extensional Prescriptions∗ to argue that we should adopt “Extensionality∗”
(a principle like Extensionality, but with the further constraint on the bijections f ) instead of Extensionality. For
Extensionality∗ is the most straightforward transformation of Extensional Prescriptions∗ into a constraint on utility
functions.
That said, these issues have little bearing on the topic of this section. For content-sensitive norms like the Principal
Principle will be incompatible with both Extensional Prescriptions and Extensional Prescriptions∗, so it won’t matter




x∈[0,1] crs(〈ch(F) = x〉) · x, as the Principal Principle requires (see Lewis (1980)).
49Thus these constraints can’t include the Indifference Principle described in section 2.3, since this principle con-
flicts with the Principal Principle (c.f. footnote 32).
50Since 1/2 = cr∗s(F) ,
∑
x∈[0,1] cr∗s(〈ch(F) = x〉) · x = 1/3.
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Principal Principle, it will always be impermissible to adopt cr∗s , even when evaluated with
respect to itself.
Premise 2. cr∗s is impermissible with respect to cr∗s .
Now consider a bijection f that maps F to G, G to F, and every other proposition to itself.51
This bijection will be such that, for all A, crs(A) = cr∗s( f (A)). Thus Extensional Prescriptions
will require that if crs is permissible with respect to crs, then cr∗s is permissible with respect to
cr∗s .
Premise 3. crs is permissible with respect to crs iff cr∗s is permissible with respect to cr∗s .
Thus given the Principal Principle and Extensional Prescriptions we get a contradiction:
crs is permissible (with respect to itself), cr∗s is impermissible (with respect to itself), but both
must have the same deontic status (with respect to themselves). So if we adopt the Principal
Principle, we must reject Extensional Prescriptions. And if we reject Extensional Prescriptions,
we have to give up on the thought that we can provide purely alethic justifications for every
prescription. Thus one can’t both adopt the Principal Principle and hold that we can provide
purely alethic justifications for every prescription.
More generally, we can see that principles which make prescriptions regarding particular
kinds of propositions (like propositions about chances) will conflict with Extensional Prescrip-
tions. For Extensional Prescriptions says that if a credal state is permissible, then any permu-
tation of its credences that keeps their distance from the evaluating credence function the same
should also be permissible. But, for principles which are content-sensitive, such permutations
can move us from credal states that satisfy the principle to credal states that violate it. So
content-sensitive principles aren’t susceptible to purely alethic justification.
Let’s conclude by considering a reply to this worry, suggested by some remarks by Petti-
grew (2013b) and Joyce (2016). To provide a purely alethic justification for a norm, one needs
to provide a justification that doesn’t appeal to anything besides the goal of having accurate
beliefs. But one might try to escape the worries sketched above by understanding “accuracy”
in a looser way than I’ve been understanding it here. Pettigrew (2013b) suggests a notion of ac-
curacy according to which a credal state is perfectly accurate when it lines up with the chances,
not when it lines up with the truth. And Joyce (2016) endorses a similar move, arguing that the
Principal Principle is compatible with Veritism by maintaining that “proponents of accuracy-
centered approaches will see [lining up one’s credences with the chances] as comprising an
essential part of the duty to rationally pursue accuracy”.52 Given one of these modified no-
tions of accuracy, one can construct an accuracy-based argument for the Principal Principle.
And while these accuracy-based justifications for the Principal Principle will yield a norm that
conflicts with Extensional Prescriptions, one might argue that this only goes to show that Ex-
tensional Prescriptions is too stringent a constraint, given this more relaxed understanding of
accuracy.
51If we adopt Extensional Prescriptions∗ instead of Extensional Prescriptions, as I suggest in footnote 47, then
we’ll generally need to spell out a more extensive bijection. But this is relatively straightforward to do.
52See Joyce (2016), p16.
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The trouble with this move is that it’s a bait and switch. Recall what we were initially
concerned with: we were concerned with the notion of accuracy (and the corresponding notion
of purely alethic justification) relevant to Veritism. And the notion of accuracy relevant to
Veritism was closeness to the truth. Now, one can modify one’s notion of accuracy so that it
tracks something other than closeness to the truth. But one can’t, at the same time, claim that
this is the notion of accuracy relevant to Veritism.53
Here’s another way to put the point. Call this modified notion of accuracy “accuracy∗”,
call a justification which doesn’t appeal to anything other than the goal of having accurate∗
beliefs “purely alethic justification∗”, and call the thesis that all epistemic norms can be given
purely alethic justifications∗ “Veritism∗”. In response to the worries sketched above, this reply
notes that one can provide purely alethic justifications∗ for evidential norms like the Principal
Principle, and thus can reconcile evidential norms with Veritism∗. But this reply doesn’t ad-
dress these worries, it just changes the topic. For these worries concerned whether one could
reconcile evidential norms with Veritism, not whether one could reconcile evidential norms
with Veritism∗.
Another worry for this move is that it seems one could make the same kind of maneu-
ver to reconcile Veritism with virtually any norm. In the maneuver suggested by Pettigrew
and Joyce, one modifies the notion of accuracy so that it assesses closeness to the chances
instead of closeness to the truth, in order to provide a purely alethic justification for the Prin-
cipal Principle. But one could equally well modify the notion of accuracy so that it assesses
closeness to Donald Trump’s credal state instead of closeness to the truth, in order to provide
a purely alethic justification for Trumpism, the claim that one should line up one’s beliefs
with Trump’s.54 Or one could modify the notion of accuracy so that it assesses closeness to
one’s current credal state instead of closeness to the truth, in order to provide a purely alethic
justification for Calcification, the claim that one should never change one’s beliefs.55
Now, perhaps the thought is that this chance-tracking notion of accuracy is tenable, while
these other modified notions of accuracy are not, because the chances (unlike Trump’s credal
state) are closely tied to the truth. First, if this is the thought, then it’s something that needs to
be demonstrated, not assumed. And demonstrating how the chances are tied to the truth in the
right way is precisely what we needed to do, in order to provide a purely alethic justification
for the Principal Principle, when we employed our original notion of accuracy. So, at best, this
version of the maneuver just brings us back to where we started.
Second, if the literature on these issues is any guide, then providing a non-question begging
argument for why lining up one’s beliefs with the chances is a good way to get true beliefs is
a project with poor prospects. (E.g., see Strevens (1999) for an extended criticism of such
arguments.) And even if we put that literature aside, we’ve just seen a positive reason for
53To press the point further, recall that the intuitive motivation for Veritism was precisely that one shouldn’t take
any factors other than closeness to the truth into account. Yet these modified notions of accuracy do just that.
54Or should line up with what one believes Trump’s beliefs to be (if we want to precisely mirror the form of the
Principal Principle).
55Or should line up with what one believes one’s beliefs to be (if we want to precisely mirror the form of the
Principal Principle). The name “Calcification” comes from Christensen (1991).
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doubting that providing a rationale for the Principal Principle along these lines is possible.
For if it were possible, then one should be able to provide a purely alethic justification for the
Principal Principle in a way that’s compatible with constraints like Extensional Prescriptions.
And as we’ve seen, this can’t be done.
In the last section we saw that it’s not possible to provide a purely alethic justification for
evidential norms unless one adopts something like Howson and Urbach’s versions of these
norms. In this section we saw that even if we do adopt the Howson and Urbach’s versions of
these norms, then, if we understand “purely alethic justification” in the way that’s relevant to
the issues at hand, there will be evidential norms for which it’s not possible to provide purely
alethic justifications. For norms which are susceptible to purely alethic justification should be
compatible with constraints like Extensional Prescriptions. And evidential norms which are
content-sensitive, like the Principal Principle, are not.
7 Conclusion
For most of this paper I’ve been taking Joyce and Pettigrew to be advocating the All-Accuracy
Account. But some passages, such as this passage from Joyce, suggest a much weaker claim:
“Proponents of accuracy-centered epistemology will want to... [maintain] that all
facts about justification are interpreted as facts about the rational pursuit of doxastic
accuracy. This would make it a truism (on the level of ‘evidence for X is evidence
for X’s truth’) that believers are justified in holding credences exactly to the extent
that their evidence makes it reasonable for them to expect those credences to be
accurate (in the aggregate).”56
This passage suggests that, perhaps, Joyce is only claiming this: for any norm, one can con-
struct an argument for that norm that has the form of a scoring rule argument. This is a claim
that I think virtually everyone would agree with. After all, similar claims have been made in
a number of places (e.g., see Stalnaker (2002)), and have been allowed to pass without chal-
lenge. And this claim seems clearly true: given any choice of utility functions, and any choice
of decision rules, one can construct an argument for any set of prescriptions one wants. Indeed,
we don’t even need this much — merely granting one free choice of decision rules is enough.57
If this is the claim that Joyce has in mind, then none of the arguments offered in this paper
are a threat to it. But this claim is uninteresting. For it doesn’t bear on any substantive issues
regarding justification, epistemic rationality, or epistemic norms.
56Joyce (2016), p18.
57To see this, note that given any utility function, one can construct a decision rule which effectively ignores that
utility function and yields the prescriptions one would get by applying decision rule X to utility function Y (for any X
and Y). (How can the rule figure out these prescriptions if they rely on the assignments of utility function Y , and the
rule has some other utility function Z , Y as an argument? Well, note that a free choice of decision rules entails a free
choice of what the arguments of the decision rule are. So one can construct a decision rule whose arguments include
whatever one needs to deduce what Y’s assignments would be.)
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In any case, questions regarding views like the All-Accuracy Account are interesting, re-
gardless of who adopts them. This paper has offered a critical look at such views. In light of
this, one might conclude that views like the All-Accuracy Account are irreparably flawed, and
should be rejected. Or one might just conclude that there are a number of issues that propo-
nents of views like the All-Accuracy Account need to address. Either way, the tension between
Veritism and evidential norms has yet to be resolved.58
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